In May 1989, Chinese government officials declared martial law following seven weeks of student-led protests dominating the nation. Following the death of politician Hu Yaobang these student protests were predominantly peaceful and expressed widespread dissatisfaction with Chinese governance. A publicly progressive but politically controversial party member, Yaobang’s death and subsequent memorials provided the opportunity for Chinese citizens to congregate on mass.
Memorials became expressive of citizen discontent within the Communist regime. Following immense social changes consequent of the end of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1976, Chinese citizens became emboldened by a collective demand for democracy, government accountability, and freedom of the press. By the 18th of May protests made up of over a million Chinese citizens. By late May, student demonstrations dominated the nation and had garnered mass domestic and foreign sympathy.
Considering the demonstrations a threat to Chinese governance, Party authorities declared martial law and mobilised government troops to Beijing. On June 3rd 1989, troops opened fire on unarmed civilians demonstrating in Tiananmen Square. Although estimates vary widely, it is understood between 1’000 and 2’600 demonstrators were killed, while thousands more were imprisoned or exiled for taking part in the demonstrations. Following the events of June 3rd and 4th, on June 5th an unidentified man blocked the path of military tanks attempting to occupy the square. This figure would come to be known as Tank Man, and would represent the militarised oppression of Chinese citizens alongside citizen resistance. Circulated widely across Western media, the image was deemed representative of the oppressive state of Chinese human rights.

This iconic image was also widely distributed in China in the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre. However, in contrast to Western articulations of the event, this image was used to demonstrate the supposed benevolence of the Chinese government. Government approved footage at the time stated,
‘Anyone with common sense can see that if our tanks were determined to move on, this lone scoundrel could never have stopped them. This scene recorded on videotape flies in the face of Western propaganda. It proves that our soldiers exercised the highest degree of restraint’.
Describing a scene of militaristic discipline and isolated insurrection, the connotations of the image are forced into change. Susan Sontag writes, ‘To the militant, identity is everything. And all photographs wait to be explained or falsified by their captions’.
In the ensuing aftermath of June 3rd, 4th, and 5th, China’s leadership implemented policies that encouraged social control, with the intention of suppressing any further resistance to Chinese governance. By the spring of 1991, 2’578 arrests were confirmed by the Chinese government, while Hong Kong sources put the figure closer to 4’000. Party policy insisted on intensified political education, while Universities across China offered more courses on politics and orthodox Marxism. Similarly, ‘140 universities adopted eight-week programs to reindoctrinate (sic) students in party ways’. This instigated a regime of overt and covert means of Chinese censorship and suppression.
In the years that followed, means of suppression culminated in the renewed censorship of Chinese media, news, and internet, among many other policies directed at freedom of expression and religion. The iconic image of ‘Tank Man’ was similarly wiped from the Chinese cultural tapestry, with a 2014 survey indicating just 15 out of a 100 Chinese students were able to identify the image. Those able to identify the image expressed a commonly expressed narrative surrounding the image:
‘he was an escaped mental patient who wandered too close to some troops and was harmlessly carried back to his hospital bed’.
This regime of historical amnesia indicates the privation of Chinese history. On the privation of history Roland Barthes notes, ‘Myth deprives the object of which it speaks of all History. In it, history evaporates’. This privation of history in the context of China’s totalitarian regime is particularly interesting when one notes the work of Hannah Arendt. She writes,
‘Nothing is more characteristic of the totalitarian movements in general and of the quality of fame of their leaders in particular than the startling swiftness with which they are forgotten and the startling ease with which they can be replaced’.
In addition to the eradication of Chinese history this policy of suppression engendered a culture of self-censorship. In a study conducted in 2007, reports revealed that not a single one of mainland China’s top 100 bloggers ‘argued in non-ambiguous terms for political change and an alternative political system’. In many respects this would appear to indicate the militaristic aims of the 1989 massacre were successful. Helen Gao, a Chinese journalist for the New York Times writes, ‘Twenty-five years after the massacre, the topic remains taboo here’. And yet, in the face of government censorship, a survey conducted in 2008 showed that China’s internet users contributed ‘more to their national blogosphere and online forums than users in other countries do in theirs’. Eight years on in 2016, China’s internet users had increased by the size of Ukraine’s population, at the fastest pace documented in three years. Lagerkviskt notes ‘the rise of the blogosphere coincides with the rise of the individual in Chinese society’. Importantly, this rise of the individual acts in contrast to Chinese traditions of collective subservience and social acquiescence.
Of these influential contemporary bloggers is Ai Weiwei, a Chinese political activist and artist. Commenting on the rise of the internet Weiwei insists,
‘the internet and social media have become the only forms of democracy in China’.
A dissident Chinese artist, Weiwei’s work acts as an indictment of totalitarian regimes, while much of his work endeavours to highlight the hypocrisy of Chinese governance. One such example is Weiwei’s 1995 piece Dropping a Han Dynasty Urn. This implicated Weiwei in the destruction of priceless Han Dynasty artefacts, in order to demonstrate the destruction of Chinese culture under the communist regime.

Utilising the internet and China’s blogosphere, Weiwei’s work confronts the oppressive regime of Chinese censorship, while similarly indicting Western countries complicit in the continuance of China’s failing human rights policies. Subject to censorship within China, Weiwei proliferates his works to the Chinese people through subversive means, encouraging collective mobilisation and resistance. Most notably, in 2009 Weiwei utilised the growing Chinese blogosphere in order to conduct the Sichuan Earthquake Names Project in 2008 as ‘an effort to […] collect the names of the deceased students in towns across Sichuan province’. Demanding the government be held to account for negligent construction, lack of aid, and refusal to document the names of deceased civilians, Weiwei engaged members of the Chinese blogosphere by instigating an act of ‘subversive mourning’. This act called on Chinese citizens to record themselves reciting the names of the 2008 earthquake victims, which Weiwei then compiled to create a damning indictment of government negligence.
Rejecting government efforts to erase Chinese history, Weiwei’s work Study of Perspective uses photography to articulate Chinese narratives of the Tiananmen Square massacre. Susan Sontag highlights the political particularities of photography stating,
‘In teaching us a new visual code, photographs alter and enlarge our notions of what is worth looking at and what we have a right to observe. They are a grammar, and, even more importantly, an ethics of seeing’.
In this regard it is particularly interesting to observe Weiwei’s photographic focus.

Foregrounded in the image is Weiwei’s hand, indignantly gesturing towards Tiananmen Square in the background. Shrouded in heavy fog, the square features isolated Chinese citizens moving through the square. Weiwei stands apart from the crowd, framing the source of his indignation by creating a wide angled shot of the region. Despite the simplicity of this image, Weiwei’s focus on Tiananmen Square echoes a rejection of the oppressive dynasty era, and the Chinese government’s part in the Tiananmen Square massacre. Exhibiting Study of Perspective internationally, Weiwei not only articulates Chinese oppression, but similarly indicts Western failings and hypocrisies. In the Study of Perspective collection Ai Weiwei features a piece titled ‘White House’ which distinctly mirrors his ‘Tiananmen Square’ piece.

Once again, Weiwei frames the source of his discontent in a wide angle shot as he gestures his rejection of authoritarian governance. In this image, Weiwei aims his discontent at the southern façade of the White House. In no uncertain terms, this image is expressive of Weiwei’s rejection of American governing bodies. This is particularly interesting when one considers the inclusion of the image in conjunction with the ‘Tiananmen Square’ image, alongside many other iconic international monuments found within the series.
Joshua Kurlantzick’s work examines the means by which the Chinese regime of suppression is bolstered. He writes
‘the governments in the West and in the democratic parts of Asia appear unwilling to examine China’s backsliding on human rights. In fact, as China becomes an increasingly important market and a more powerful force in global organizations, they seem more and more willing to buy Beijing’s rosy portrayal of its human rights record’.
In this regard, the continued flow of foreign direct investment (particularly from America to China) sustains the regime’s ability to ‘buy the political quiescence of both urban workers and students’. Weiwei’s Study of Perspective not only admonishes the events of the Tiananmen Square massacre, but similarly rejects the increasing complicity of Western governments in civic atrocities. He writes,
‘because you need a small favour you’re sacrificing very essential values. […] every deal made here happens because the rights of so many people are ignored. You profit at the expense of the people who have been put in jail or who are missing, just because they spoke the truth’.
Many of these deals threaten the subversive capacity of China’s one vestige of democracy: the internet. Of these deals is the sale of image and video stock of licensing agency Corbis to Visual China Group (VCG) a licensing group based in Beijing. While the image of Tank Man is not explicitly included in the deal, concerns have undoubtedly arisen regards the further erasure of the events of 1989.
Rejecting the threat of censorship, Weiwei’s Study of Perspective demands the articulation of Chinese atrocities, while similarly interrogating Western acts of complicity. In doing so Weiwei uses the medium of the image to call for government accountability, freedom of the press, and a rejection of totalitarian regimes. In many respects, Weiwei’s efforts echo the 1989 protests, admonishing government corruption and resisting the erasure of Chinese history. Raising awareness via international exhibitions of his work, Weiwei demands the articulation of Chinese events denied by Chinese government officials.
Citing the power of the image, Sontag writes, ‘What determines the possibility of being affected morally by photography is the existence of a relevant political consciousness’. In the proliferation of this political consciousness, through the Chinese blogosphere and art, Weiwei ultimately rejects the privation of Chinese history.